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MOOT COURT
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE V.
CITY OF HIALEAH
Lower Court Opinion
91-948 CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU
AYE INC. v. HIALEAH, FLA.
Municipal ban against killing animals for ritual or
sacrifice.
Ruling below (CA I1. 6/11/91, unpublished):
Court affirms district court's ruling that mu-
nicipal ordinance that bars slaughter of animals
for any type of ritual except in properly zoned
slaughterhouses does not violate Free Exercise
Clause rights of members of church whose rites
include animal sacrifice.
Questions presented: (1) Is rule of Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 58 LW
4433 (1990), that laws restricting religious exer-
cise must be neutral and generally applicable
violated by ordinances that forbid killing of ani-
mals for ritual or sacrifice, but permit killing of
animals for wide variety of secular reasons? (2)
What must city prove to show compelling interest
sufficient to justify law that discriminates against
religion in violation of Employment Division v.
Smith? (3) Must compelling interest justify dis-
crimination, or is it sufficient to have interest that
would justify non-discriminatory general prohibi-
tion? (4) Must compelling interest be of extraor-
dinary importance, or is any legitimate interest
sufficient? (5) Must compelling interest be based
on actual harms, or is it sufficient to identify risks
and challenge worshipers to prove that risks can
never come to fruition?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/19/91, by
Jeanne Baker, and Jorge A. Duarte, both of
Miami, Fla., Douglas Laycock, of Austin, Texas,
and Mitchell Horwich, and Horwich & Zager
P.A., both of Coral Gables, Fla.
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Fourth Affirmative Defense
(9] BBI's fourth affirmative defense
merely alleges that "[o]n information and
belief, the letter of credit was fraudulently
obtained by Diana by misrepresenting to
the account party, Lafayette, the purpose
of the letter of credit." Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that fraud be plead with particularity. Be-
cause BBI alleges fraud only in conclusory
terms without stating with the requisite
specificity any particulars of the misrepre-
sentation, the fourth affirmative defense is
insufficient as a matter of law. See Visco-
mi v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 596 F.Supp. 1537 (S.D.Fla.1984) (dis-
missing complaint for failure to plead fraud
with particularity). Accordingly, ABN's
Motion to Strike BBI's fourth affirmative
defense is granted.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as fol-
lows:
1. ABN's Motion for Rehearing is
GRANTED.
2. The state court's order granting in-
terpleader is VACATED.
3. ABN's Motion to Dismiss is GRANT-
ED to the extent that BBI's cross-claim is
DISMISSED without prejudice as to such
pleadings as BBI deems advisable to file
within 30 days from the date of this Order.
BRI's counterclaim is likewise DIS-
MISSED.
4. The Clerk of this Court shall return
to BBI the funds transferred into its Regis-
try pursuant to this Court's Order of Sep-
tember 14, 1989.
5. ABN's Motion to Strike is DENIED
as to BBI's first and third affirmative de-
fenses, and GRANTED as to BBI's second
and fourth affirmative defenses.
6. Lafayette's Motion to Require In-
vestment of Funds Interplead in Court
Registry is MOOT.
S* In BB's Memorandum in Opposition to ABN's
Motion to Compel Discovery, BBI stated that it
has already prepared its response to the inter-
rogatories propounded by ABN and had every
intention of serving them." However, because
7. ABN's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment is HELD IN ABEYANCE.
8. BBI's Motion for Stay of ABN's
Cross-claim Proceeding is MOOT.
9. BBI's Motion for Enlargement of
Time to Respond to Summary Judgment
Motion is MOOT.
10. BBI's Motion for Enlargement of
Time to Respond to Interrogatories served
on BBI by ABN on June 19, 1989, is
GRANTED. BBI shall answer the inter-
rogatories and requests for production
within 30 days from the date of this Order.
11. ABN's Motion to Compel Discovery
is DENIED without prejudice in order that
discovery shall proceed for a period of 120
days from the date of this Order.s
12. BBI shall have thirty (30) days with-
in which to file a counterclaim against La-
fayette. Lafayette shall then have twenty
(20) days after receipt of the same to an-
swer or otherwise plead. .
DONE AND ORDERED.
D UMBEiR SYEM
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU
AYE, INC., and Ernesto
Pichardo, Plaintiffs,
V.
CITY OF HIALEAH, Defendant.
No. 87-1795-CIV-EPS.




Religious group brought action under
§ 1983 alleging that city's enactment of
this Court finds there was sufficient basis for
BBI's Motion for Stay of ABN's Cross-claim Pro-
ceedings, no attorneys' fees and costs incurred
by ABN in making its Motion to Compel Dis-
covery shall be assessed against BBI.
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ordinances regulating ritual animal sacri-
fice violated their First Amendment rights.
The District Court, Spellman, J., held that:
(1) ordinances were not preempted by state
slaughter or anticruelty laws; (2) ordi-
nances did not impermissibly infringe on
plaintiffs' freedom of religion; and (3)





Municipal ordinances regulating ritual
animal sacrifice did not conflict with ritual
slaughter exemption to Florida slaughter
laws, as would render ordinances preempt-
ed by slaughter laws, insofar as ordinances
prohibited sacrifice where primary purpose
was not food consumption while slaughter
laws applied only to slaughtering of ani-
mals for food. West's F.S.A. §§ 828.22-
828.26, 828.22(3).
2. Animals e15
Zoning and Planning e=14
Municipal ordinances prohibiting ritual
slaughter of animals for food purposes ex-
cept where properly zoned did not conflict
with exemption to Florida slaughter laws
for ritual slaughter, as would render ordi-
nances preempted by slaughter laws, inas-
much as ordinances were primarily zoning
regulations which city could properly enact
under its police power. West's F.S.A.
§§ 585.34(3), 828.22(3).
3. Animals e41
Zoning and Planning e-14
Municipal ordinances prohibiting ritual
slaughter of animals except where proper-
ly zoned and providing for criminal penal-
ties were primarily zoning ordinances and,
thus, did not conflict with Florida statute
controlling penalties in ordinances relating
to animal control or cruelty. West's F.S.A.
§ 828.27(2).
SUPPLEMENT
4. Municipal Corporations e=592(i)
Municipal ordinance authorizing reg.
istered groups to investigate animal cruelt,
complaints did not conflict with Florida an-
ticruelty law, as would render ordinance
preempted by anticruelty law. West.,
F.S.A. § 828.03.
5. Constitutional Law e-84.5(1)
Municipal ordinances regulating ritual
sacrifice of animals did not violate First
Amendment, as applied to members of
Santeria religion, which practices animal
sacrifice; ordinances were directed at con-
duct rather than belief, had secular pur.
pose and effect, and were justified by gov.
ernmental interests in public health and
safety, and animal and child welfare.
6. Courts e-96(3)
Lower courts are bound by summary
decisions of the Supreme Court, unless re-
versed by that court.
7. Constitutional Law e-84.5(1)
Municipal ordinances regulating ritual
sacrifice of animals did not violate First
Amendment on their face, inasmuch as or-
dinances could constitutionally apply to
wide range of conduct other than conduct
of religious group challenging ordinances.
8. Civil Rights e=206(3)
Where injury is inflicted solely by its
employees or agents, local government is
not liable under § 1983; rather, it is only
when execution of municipality's official
policy inflicts injury that government as
entity can be liable under § 1983. 42 U.S.
C.A. § 1983.
9. Civil Rights e111
Religious group failed to establish that
city's enactment of ordinances regulating
ritual animal sacrifice was done to discrimi-
nate against or harass group in violation of
its members' rights to freely exercise their
religion, as was required to state claim
against city under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
Jorge A. Duarte, Miami, Fla., Mitchell
Horwich, Coral Gables, Fla., Maurice RE
sen, North Miami Beach, Fla., Stanley
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Pred, Arthur B. Calvin, Miami, Fla., for
plaintiffs.
Richard G. Garrett, Stuart H. Singer,
Laura H. Thomas of Greenberg, Traurig,
Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A.,
Miami, Fla., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SPELLMAN, District Judge.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
THIS CAUSE was tried before the Court
without a jury on July 31, and August 2, 3,
7, 8, 9; 11, 14, and 15, 1989. Plaintiffs
brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to enjoin, declare unconstitutional,
and recover damages for the alleged depri-
vation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights,
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, by the CITY OF HIALEAH.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant's passage
of certain ordinances and resolutions, and
Defendants' alleged "process of discour-
agement, harassment, threats, punishment,
detention, and threats of prosecution" vio-
late Plaintiffs constitutional rights. The
Church specifically is seeking the right of
the Church to perform animal sacrifices on
Church premises, and for the right of
Church members to perform sacrifices in
their own homes.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which
provides for jurisdiction of actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1. Although this Church was incorporated in
1973, the only information this Court has re-
garding the Church is from Pichardo's testimo-
ny. From that testimony, it appears that the
Church's activities began at the time that the
events leading up to this lawsuit were initiated;
i.e., at the time that the Church first leased the
property in Hialeah and attempted to obtain
their licenses. This Court has no information
regarding any Church activities before that
time.
Upon careful consideration of the record,
the exhibits, and the memorandum filed by
the parties, this Court makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff, CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI
BABALU AYE, INC. ("the Church"), is a
not-for-profit corporation organized under
the laws of the State of Florida in 1973.1
Plaintiff, ERNESTO PICHARDO ("Pichar-
do"), is President of the Church and holds
the religious rank of "Italero." Defendant,
CITY OF HIALEAH ("the City"), is a mu-
nicipal corporation situated in the State of
Florida.
A. Background
The Church promotes the Lukumi reli-
gion, generically referred to as Yoba or
Yoruba, and commonly referred to as
Santeria. Yoba or Yoruba is an ancient
religion that originated almost 4000 years
ago with the Bantu people-the proto-
group of the Yoruba people of West Africa,
who live mainly in Southern Nigeria. Yo-
ruba is one of the three indigenous reli-
gions of the Yoruba people and is practiced
openly in Nigeria today.
During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries,
great numbers of Yoba practitioners were
enslaved and brought to the eastern region
of Cuba," where the practice of their native
religion was forbidden. Slaves were ex-
pected to become Christians,3 and practi-
tioners of Yoba were persecuted by the
authorities and discriminated against by
the populace.
The slaves, to escape the severe penalties
and social stigma, began to express the
Yoba faith through the use of Catholic
2. This area was at one time called Oriente Prov-
ince. It is now split up into two provinces.
3. One of the justifications for slavery often used
by the Spanish government was that they were
not really engaging in slavery per se, but that
they were really engaged in the business of
saving souls. Thus, before slaves were loaded
onto slave ships, they were often baptized. The
slave ships themselves were often given names
like "Jesus- and "Estella" (Hope).
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saints and symbolism.4 This syncretism 5
permitted slaves to practice Yoba, or Sante-
ria, while appearing to practice Catholi-
cism.
Thus, for 400 years, Santeria was an
underground religion practiced mostly by
slaves and the descendants of slaves.
Eventually it spilled over from the black
population to the white population. How-
ever, Santeria was seen as backward, as
the religion of slaves and remained under-
ground, first from fear of persecution, and
later, from fear of discrimination and social
stigma.
Santeria first came to the United States
with the Cuban exiles who fled the Castro
regime in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
Other Afro-Caribbean religions, like Voo-
doo, Macumba, and Palo Mayombe, arose
from the same circumstances in other Car-
ibbean islands, and also exist in South Flor-
ida, brought here by natives of those is-
lands.6 In total, there are approximately
50,000 to 60,000 practitioners of Santeria in
South Florida today, and an untold number
of people who practice animal sacrifice.
Santeria remains an underground reli-
gion and the practice was not, and is not
today, socially accepted by the majority of
the Cuban population. Additionally, Sante-
ria has lost some contact with its own past
in Cuba. Most religious activity takes
place in individual homes by extended fami-
ly groups. There is little or no intermin-
gling of the groups, and few practitioners
know others outside their own group that
practice Santeria. Santeria has remained
underground because most practitioners
4. For example, because Saint Peter was associat-
ed with iron, the keys to heaven, Yoba practi-
tioners saw Saint Peter as Shango, the god of
lightening and thunder.
5. Syncretism is a term which refers to the
blending of two cultures.
6. It is often very difficult for an outsider to tell
from religious relics which Afro-Caribbean reli-
gion is being practiced. That is one of the
problems in identifying the source of the animal
carcasses that are left in public. It is hard to
tell if they have been left by practitioners of
another Afro-Caribbean religion or by practi-
tioners of Santeria whose methods and interpre-
tations differ from what Pichardo believes are
the true and universal tenants of Santeria.
fear that they will be discriminated against.
The religion has taken on a private, person.
al tone that is very different than the way
that it is practiced in Nigeria. Although
Pichardo feels that the religion would be-
come more open if the Church was allowed
to practice its rituals openly, Dr. Lisandro
Perez, a sociologist, testified that in his
opinion, the outcome of this case would not
necessarily affect the degree of which
Santeria was practiced in private.7
Pichardo testified that although he holds
the priesthood rank of "Italero," he can not
estimate the number of practitioners in the
City of Hialeah, nor does he know how
many of the members of his Church are
priests, or hold any particular rank in the
priesthood.8 Additionally, although Pichar.
do claims that there are about ten Italeros
in Dade County, he has only met two.
There is an annual conference of Santeria
priests held in New York, but Pichardo
testified that he has never been invited to
one, nor attended one.
Santeria has an interrelationship of be-
liefs with conduct of life, i.e., holidays, sab-
bath, days of worship. There are ceremo-
nies for life cycle events such as child
birth, marriage and death rites. Beliefs
and practices have remained fairly constant
over time, but are based on the interpreta-
tion of an oral tradition. There is no orga-
nized worship, with a centralized authority,
and, with the exception of written tenets
prepared by Pichardo (possibly in prepara-
tion of this lawsuit), no written code or
tradition appears to exist.9
7. Dr. Perez stated that "[tlhere may be a lot of
Santeros who may not wish to place their be-
liefs on a public sort of marketplace."
8. The rank of "Italero" is the second highest
rank in Santeria although there are different
levels of knowledge within that rank. The rank
above Italero is "Babalawo." Pichardo testified
that he did not know if any member of his
Church held the rank of "Babalawo."
9. Pichardo prepared a "Code of Beliefs" and
"Code of Ethics" that he believes correctly sets
forth the oral traditions (as taught to him)
which in turn reflect the universal principles of
the religion. This document is intended by Pi-
chardo to take the oral tradition and turn it into
a written tradition. Pichardo testified that this
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Pichardo testifies that priests are trained
as apprentices by other priests, guided by
the oral traditions. Different priests per-
form different functions, such as div-
ination, and sacrifice, and a priest must
train in each different discipline he wishes
to pursue. There is, however, no central
authority which establishes, or verifies, a
priest's training or credentials. 0
B. Animal Sacifice
Animals, including chickens, pigeons,
doves, ducks, guinea fowl, goats, sheep,
and turtles, are sacrificed as an integral
part of the rituals and ceremonies conduct-
ed by practitioners of Santeria. According
to Pichardo, most, but not all, of the ani-
mals are consumed as food after they are
sacrificed." A priest that performs sacri-
fice is taught as an apprentice through
observation of sacrifices. Only priests
trained in this manner are supposed to
conduct animal sacrifice. Those priests are
not involved in obtaining, maintaining,
butchering, cooking or disposing of the sac-
document had gone through the process of be.
ing analyzed by a group of elder priests; how.
ever, Pichardo gave no evidence to support this
claim, and in fact has consistently testified that
he doesn't even know which members of the
Church are priests.
10. Pichardo testified that it is very difficult to
tell who was a practitioner or priest in the
Santeria religion. He stated that "[Santeria]
does not have this center where people can go
and you can monitor and you have a number of
set controls over that religious community." Pi-
chardo went on to testify that the Church did
establish its own internal identification tech-
niques during the Mariel boatlift because there
were a number of refugees that claimed to be
priests of the faith:
[Tlhere were some loose ends out there that
were in fact posing to be priests of the faith
and were actually doing Santeria or what
appeared to be Santeria ceremonies and rip-
ping people literally off, and then they would
take several thousand dollars from someone
and take off, take off from Miami, and we
had no religious or even legal means to be
able to make use of or control those situa-
tions, so we did the best we could.
11. Animals used in healing rites are almost nev-
er consumed.
12. According to Pichardo, the preparation for
the animal sacrifice requires that there be sever-
al priests, all with different functions. For ex-
723 F.Supp.-34
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rificial animals. 2 Pichardo, even as a high
priest, is unaware of how those other func-
tions were actually performed, although he
did state that the animals were expected to
be healthy, clean and free of disease. The
priests receive no training in establishing
that an animal is disease-free, but rely on
personal observation. Pichardo himself
has never been involved in the disposal of
animal carcass and has no knowledge of
what is actually done with the remains of
sacrificed animals, whether or not any part
of the animal is consumed. 3
There appears to be no prohibition in the
Santeria religion against animal burial, ani-
mal incineration, or animal disposal in sani-
tary waste containers or animal disposal in
any form. Pichardo testified that the
Church would have no problem in comply-
ing with legal requirements in those areas;
but there was no way in which other practi-
tioners, outside the Church itself, could be
monitored or controlled; and no legal re-
quirements to which this Court could ad-
dress itself. 4
ample, there are those who clean-up after the
sacrifice; a person who actually handles the
animal-inspects the animal to see that it is
healthy and clean and then brings that animal
to the place where it is to be sacrificed; a priest
and his apprentice who actually kill the animal;
a person who removes the carcass; a butcher or
butchers; a person who takes the butchered
animal to be cooked; a cook or cooks. Each
function is kept separate from the other and no
one else really knows how each person per-
forms his or her function.
13. Pichardo speculated that the remains of sac-
rificed animals were probably placed in the
garbage of the private homes. Pichardo further
testified that he has no idea of the average
number of animal sacrifice performed each
week in the City of Hialeah by priests of the
Yoba faith.
14. In the Yoba rqligion, divination is based on
the ifa divination cycle. Ifa is made up of 256
odus or principles. Each odu is further subdi-
vided in groups of 16. Divination through ifa is
usually performed by the casting of shells or
stones. The pattern is then read and interpret-
ed as communication from the various deities.
Through divination, ifa mandates the type of
animal to be sacrificed and the use to which the
sacrifice should be put. It is the individual
priests, however, who interpret, or misinterpret,
the basic principles of i/a. Pichardo interprets
723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
Pichardo testified that the actual killing
of the animal is taught by oral apprentice-
ship. The apprentice, by observing an ex-
perienced priest, sees where and how the
knife should be inserted. Ultimately, the
apprentice priest becomes certain that he
can adequately perform the sacrifice and
do the actual killings assisted by the teach-
er.15 After the teacher is satisfied that the
student has the ability to perform the sacri-
fice, the student is allowed to kill the ani-
mal without assistance. A student may be
taught by more than one priest.
According to Pichardo, an animal that is
to be sacrificed is placed on a table on its
left side. The apprentice holds the legs
and the priest that will perform the sacri-
fice stands on the other side of the animal
and holds the animal's head, with the head
facing away from the priest.16 The ani-
mal's head extends beyond the edge of the
table and is held high on the nose area by
the priest's left hand. The knife is held in
the priest's right hand (even if the priest
happens to be left-handed).
Pichardo testified that the animal is
killed within a matter of moments after
being placed on the table. The priest punc-
tures the neck of the animal with a knife 17
right into the main arteries in one move-
the religious principles of Santeria as requiring
that a practitioner obey the law; i.e., if the law
says that dead animals cannot be disposed of in
public roadways, a practitioner could not dis-
pose of the carcass in such a way and still be in
compliance with religious principles. However,
a priest could interpret i/a to require that an
animal carcass be left in the open, or even
neglect to consult the i/a at all regarding the
disposal. Pichardo testified that he had a
strong feeling that lesser nonhierarchy priests
do misinterpret the divination process and
could in fact order the disposal of animal re-
mains in public places. Pichardo claims that
such a priest would be a deviant, but admits
that such a priest could interpret ifa in that way.
Pichardo speculated that his Church would be
able to stop what he considered to be deviant
practices, but gave no indication on how this
would be accomplished, beyond just opposing
such practices. Pichardo speculates that if the
Church is allowed to practice its rituals openly,
it will "absorb the thousands that are out there
in South Florida and have them come in and
not hide behind doors because of fear of perse-
cution and discrimination and what have you."
However, Pichardo admits that while he esti-
mates 50,000-60,000 Santeria practitioners in
ment. The knife is inserted into the right-
hand side of the animal's neck and is
pushed all the way through the animal's
neck. The knife does not actually cut the
throat of the animal, but instead goes di-
rectly into the vein area, just behind the
throat, and in front of the vertebrae., This
hopefully would sever both of the main
arteries of the animal.
There was expert testimony 18 that estab-
lished that this method of killing is not
humane because there is no guarantee that
a person performing a sacrifice in the man-
ner described can cut through both carotid
arteries at the same time. Additionally,
some of the lining of the artery can recoil
and close the artery to prevent the instant
hemorrhaging, in a tourniquet effect. Dr.
Fox concluded, and this Court finds, that
the method used by the priest is not a
reliable or painless method of severing
both carotid arteries.
Dr. Fox also testified, and this Court
finds, that with young goats or sheep,
there are deeper arteries within the ver-
tebrae so that these animals would not
likely be unconscious instantaneously.
Only a complete neck severance can make
it clear that the arteries have all been sev-
ered and a stabbing or poking is not accept-
South Florida, he has no idea how many are
located in Hialeah, or how many would actually
come forward and join the Church.
15. The teacher and the student both hold onto
the knife and the teacher guides the student
through the killing stroke a number of times.
16. The priest is standing in a position so that the
back of the animal on the table is basically
against the front of the priest.
17. The knife is usually approximately 4 inches
long.
18. The expert witness, Dr. Michael Fox, is the
vice-president of the Humane Society of the
United States and directs the Center for Respect
for Life and Environment in Washington, D.C.
Dr. Fox has a degree in veterianarian medicine
from the Royal Veterinary College in London.
He also has a Ph.D. in medicine from London
University and a Doctor of Science in Animal
Behavior Ethology. Dr. Fox has written approx-
imately thirty books, including books on farm
animals and caring for poultry, sheep and other
livestock.
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ed from either a traditional standpoint or a
humane standpoint.
A chicken is even more problematic be-
cause of the fact that poultry have both
internal and external carotid arteries. In
other words, there are four carotid arteries
that must be severed. Those arteries are
rubbery and slide, and this increases the
possibility of one of the arteries being
missed.
The animal being killed is likely to expe-
rience both pain and fear. First, the ani-
mals are often kept in close confinement
and with animals other than its own species
while awaiting sacrifice. This causes great
stress and anxiety to the animal. Second,
an animal led into a room where other
animals had just been killed would perceive
the body secretions of the animals that had
been killed. Animals that experience fear
often secrete chemical metabolites know as
thermones, and the odor of these ther-
mones can trigger an intense fear reaction
in other animals that detect those odors.' 9
The stress and fear experienced by chick-
ens is particularly dangerous because the
chickens' immune systems become affected
and this leads to the increased growth of
bacteria, salmonella especially, in those
chickens' systems. Salmonella is very
harmful to humans and a visual inspection
of a chicken would not reveal that it had
this disease.
Although an expert pathologist, Dr. Wet-
li, testified for Plaintiffs that the death of
19. Animals may not always appear to be experi-
encing fear because of a condition known as
"tonic immobility" where an animal in intense
fear simply freezes, or becomes immobile.
Those animals, however, are experiencing both
fear and pain. Dr. Fox testified, and this Court
finds, that the chance of an animal under these
circumstances not defecating or urinating could
only occur if the animal was deprived of food
and water for a period of time prior to the
sacrifice.
20. Dr. Wetli defined rapid as being "within less
than a minute."
21. The number of animals sacrificed and the
number of pots of blood collected depend on
the number of deities involved in that ceremo-
ny. There was some credible testimony that the
blood is at times actually drunk, placed on indi-
viduals, or left in the pots for long periods,
the animal, as described, would be very
rapid, 20 Dr. Wetli is not a veterinarian and
has no knowledge of any biological differ-
ences that might impact on his evaluation.
Dr. Wetli testified that even though the
animal might experience pain, but that the
animal's interpretation of the pain might
not be the same as a human's. The Court
finds that the testimony of Dr. Fox, with
his specialized knowledge, is more credible
in this area and, accepts Dr. Fox's conclu-
sions that the method used in sacrificing
the animals is not humane, but in fact
causes great fear and pain to the animal.
According to Pichardo, after the animal
is killed, the animal's blood is drained into'
clay pots placed underneath the animal's
head. The animal is then decapitated and
removed from the area. The pots of blood
are placed before the deities until the ani-
mal's carcass is removed.2' Then, accord-
ing to the way Pichardo was taught, the
blood is also removed and disposed of; but
how it is disposed of remains a mystery.
Pichardo testified that in the initiation
rite, which lasts for eight days, the sacri-
fices all occur on the second day, one after
another.3 The initiate and the priests are
in a "sacred" room. Only those with a
specific function are allowed in the sacred
room. The initiate is confined to one cor-
ner of the room and must stay in that
corner of the room for the entire eight
days.u The usual age of an initiate is
although Pichardo testified that he would find
these to be deviant practices. One witness testi-
fied that his parents had practiced Santeria and,
as a child, he had been offered blood to drink,
but had refused.
22. Pichardo estimated up to 600 initiations per
year are performed in private homes in Dade
County. Pichardo admitted that the constant
traffic in and out of the house during the eight
day initiation rites could disturb the neighbors,
as well as the butchering of the animals if the
neighbors could observe it. Additionally, Pi-
chardo testified that between 20 and 30 animals
are usually sacrificed during an initiation rite.
That means that between 12.000 and 18,000 ani-
mals are sacrificed in initiation rites alone, dur-
ing a one year period.
23. The initiate can leave the room, under guard,
only to use the bathroom facilities.
723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
30-35 years old, but children as young as
seven years have been initiated.24
The sacrificial animals are brought into
the room and led over to the initiate for the
initiate to touch. In an initiation ceremony
there are between .6 and 13 deities and
anywhere from 24 to 56 four-legged ani-
mals and fowl are sacrificed. 5
The animals are butchered, cooked and
eaten during the eight day initiation period.
The butchering is usually done outside.
This Court finds it incredible that so many
animals can be properly butchered and
cooked in one home in a matter of hours; it
is much more likely that this process takes
most, if not all, of the remaining seven
days.
In the faith healing rites, usually only
one animal is sacrificed. The illness is
considered to have then passed to the ani-
mal. The animal is not eaten, but is either
placed on the altar of the deity for several
hours, or is disposed of entirely.26 There
was no testimony as to how the animal
carcass is ultimately disposed of."
A priest can obtain animals from many
different sources. Usually a priest works
mostly with one botanica.2" Pichardo testi-
fied that he assumes that the animals are
usually purchased from licensed vendors
that purchase only animals that have been
properly inspected; however, he was never
involved in this part of the ritual and the
testimony revealed that this is not usually
the case. Most animals are bought either
from botanicas or from local farms that
24. Young children are usually only initiated if it
is considered a crisis situation, i.e., if the child
has some type of illness. Pichardo himself was
initiated at age 16. Additionally, children of all
ages are permitted to witness the public sacri-
fices during the annual ceremonies, as long as
the parents are present.
25. A usual initiation would involve the sacrifice
of six four-legged animals and twenty-four
chickens.
26. In the death rites, there are usually one four-
legged animal and two fowl sacrificed. Those
animals are not consumed either.
27. No witness could recall ever seeing how a
carcass was disposed of, even Pichardo, who
had himself performed animal sacrifice. The
only testimony regarding the disposal of animal
breed the animals specifically for sacrifice.
Most of the time, botanicas are not licensed
to sell or house animals on their premises
but will buy the animals from the local
farms or transport the animals into the
state illegally. The animals are often kept
in overcrowded and filthy conditions-on the
farms. Additionally, when the botanicas
buy the animals, they are transported and
then kept in the botanicas' back rooms,
again often in extremely overcrowded con.
ditions. The animals are not always fed
and watered, but instead are kept for only
a few days then sold for immediate sacri-
fice. These conditions can cause intense
suffering by the animal.
There was significant testimony about
the remains of animals, along with reli-
gious paraphernalia, being found in public
places." Pichardo admitted that these
things happen, but state that some of them
are probably the result of other religions
that practice animal sacrifice. Pichardo did
admit, however, that some of the carcasses
were probably the result of Santeria practi-
tioners who were deviating from the cor-
rect principles, at least as Pichardo inter-
preted them."0
There have been no instances document-
ed of any infectious disease originating
from the remains of animals being left in
public places. Animal remains are, how-
ever, a health hazard because the remains
attract flies, rats and other animals. Both
vectors " and reservoirs 32 are created
carcasses was the testimony relating to the car.
casses found in public places, which some wit-
nesses testified to as being consistent with the
practice of Santeria.
28. A botanica is a store that specializes in sell-
ing religious articles-usually those articles as-
sociated with or used in Santeria and in animals
for sacrifice.
29. Animal carcasses are most often found near
rivers or canals, by four-way stop signs, under
certain palms, and sometimes in people's lawns
or on doorsteps.
30. See footnote 14.
31. A vector is a means by which a pathogenic
organism is transmitted or transferred from One
agent to another agent.
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around such animal remains because the
rats, flies and other animals that are at-
tracted may themselves carry and ex-
change diseases and thus the risk of the
spread of disease to humans is increased.
Flies alone have been known to transmit up
to 65 different kinds of human and animal
diseases." Areas where dead animals are
left can become a harborage for rats and
fleas where the spread of disease to other
animals and to humans is much more like-
ly.34
There was also much testimony regard-
ing the effect on children exposed to ani-
mal sacrifices. Dr. Raul Huesmann, a re-
search psychologist, has done extensive re-
search on the development of aggressive 35
and violent behavior in child and adults.
He specializes in the study of the effects of
the observation of violence on the develop-
ment of such behavior. Dr. Huesmann tes-
tified that the observation of animal sacri-
fice, particularly in the circumstances of
the initiation rite where a number of ani-
mals are sacrificed would detrimentally af-
fect the mental health of the child and the
behavior in such a way that it would be
detrimental to the community in which the
child resides. Specifically, the observation
would be likely to produce psychological
processes that promote greater tolerance
of aggressive and violent behavior and
might even increase the possibility of ag-
gressive and violent behavior by the child
himself.
There are three psychological processes
that are involved: 1) desensitization; 2)
tolerance; and 3) imitation. Desensitiza-
tion occurs when the child is exposed to
repeated scenes of violence. The child
stops reacting emotionally to those acts
32. A reservoir is an area-either another ani-
mal, an animate object or an inanimate object-
where the organism can lodge and multiply.
33. For example, the more common diseases car-
ried by flies include dysentery, typhoid, cholera,
salmonella, salmonosis, infectious hepatitis,
yaws, tracoma and many of the parasitic
worms. Rats are commonly associated with
plague, Leptus pyrosis, and marine typhus.
34. Dr. Wetli, the pathologist that testified for
Plaintiffs, agreed with this conclusion.
and the acts become more palatable to the
child. Tolerance results from this process
of desensitization. Imitation is the final
stage. A child is more likely to imitate and
be influenced by actors that are perceived
as being of high status. In other words, if
the child perceives the person engaging in
the violent act as a high status person, the
effects seem to be exacerbated. This ef-
fect would be strongest with multiple acts
that are spaced out in time. Dr. Huesmann
concluded that a child's observation of ani-
mal sacrifice would be likely to increase the
probability that the child will behave ag-
gressively and violently, not just against
animals but against humans.
The observation of violence is only one
factor in the development of aggressive
and violent behavior. An individual can
have violent and aggressive behavior which
is totally unrelated to the observation of
violence.3 6 Dr. Huesmann did not testify
that observation of violence would lead in-
alterably to violent behavior; just that such
observation was more likely to promote
such behavior. Whether the aggressive be-
havior will become serious enough to be a
problem would depend on the convergence
of a number of other factors.
What Dr. Huesmana did testify to, and
what this Court accepts, is that there is a
correlation between the observation of vio-
lence by children, especially when conduct-
ed by persons of perceived high status, and
the likelihood of the development of violent
and aggressive behavior." The younger
the child, the stronger the effect. The
Court is convinced that the observation of
animal sacrifice can have a detrimental ef-
fect on a child's mental health and on that
child's future behavior.
35. The term "aggression" is used to denote in-
tentional violence, as opposed to the term as it
is sometimes used to denote assertive behavior.
36. For example, some persons have various
kinds of tumors and abnormalities in certain
areas of their brain and, as a consequence,
behave very violently.
37. Dr. Huesmann stated that "you would have
people who would be more likely to engage in
violent acts as adults of a comparable popula-
tion not exposed to the same scenes."
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Dr. Angel Velez-Diaz, a clinical psycholo-
gist, disagreed with Dr. Huesmann's con-
clusions, based on his observations of the
clients that he had treated. Dr. Velez-Diaz
agreed that observation of violence leads to
a desensitization towards violence, but did
not believe that this have a negative effect.
Dr. Velez-Diaz admitted that the presence
of desensitization may help in the produc-
tion of violent behavior but stated that
many other intervening factors would have
to occur for such behavior to manifest
Dr. Velez-Diaz felt that because children
witnessing animal sacrifices have been pre-
pared for that event, no negative effects
would occur. It would become a normal
thing, although at first it would create
some fear in the child.
Dr. Velez-Diaz has never conducted any
studies in the area of the observation of
violence by children, but agrees that the
majority of studies do find a correlation
between such observation and the possibili-
ty of an increase in violent behavior. Dr.
Velez-Diaz did not think that such studies
were valid when applied to children observ-
ing ritualistic animal sacrifice, but did not
support his conclusion factually. This
Court, in exercising its function as trier of
fact, finds the testimony of Dr. Huesmann
more credible.
A third expert, Ms. Hendrix, an educator
at Miami Dade Community College, testi-
fied that she had done a study on children's
attitudes towards death and had found that
children exposed to death, both animal and
human, saw death as a much more natural
process. Ms. Hendrix concluded that a
child that had been prepared to view animal
sacrifice would view that sacrifice like any
normal religious experience. Ms. Hendrix
does not view animal sacrifice as a violent
act.
This Court did not find Ms. Hendrix's
views persuasive. First, she is completely
unfamiliar with the studies done by Dr.
Huesmann. Second, her own research had
to do with attitudes towards death, not
violence. Third, she claimed no personal
knowledge regarding how animals were
sacrificed, nor did she claim to have any
contact with children who had observed
such sacrifices.
C. The Ordinances
The Church occupied land situated at 173
West 5th Street, in Hialeah, Florida, in
June of 1987, and began to seek the appro-
priate licenses to allow it to function as an
established Santeria church. The goal was
to establish a church, a school, a cultural
center and a museum, and to bring Sante-
ria into the open as an established and
accepted religion. The Church fully intend-
ed to perform all of the religious rituals of
Santeria, including animal sacrifice. The
Church is currently located at 700 Palm
Avenue, Hialeah, Florida, a commercial
area.
Just after the Church began to organize
and to prepare the land at 173 West 5th
Street for occupancy, the Hialeah City
Council enacted several ordinances regulat-
ing the killing of animals: No. 87-40 (an
emergency ordinance adopting the lan-
guage of the state's anti-cruelty statute,
passed June 9, 1987); No. 87-52 (prohibit-
ing the possession of animals intended for
sacrifice or slaughter except where zoned,
passed September 8, 1987); No. 87-71 (au-
thorizing registered groups to investigate
animal cruelty complaints, passed Septem-
ber 22, 1987); and No. 87-72 (prohibiting
the slaughtering of any animals on premis-
es not properly zoned for that purpose,
passed September 22, 1987).
The City passed the ordinances pursuant
to § 828.27, which authorizes municipalities
to enact ordinances which are not in con-
flict with Chapter 828. The ordinances do
not conflict with Chapter 828, Florida Stat-
utes but clarify that religious sacrifice of
animals is not included in the exemption
provided for ritual slaughter in kosher
slaughterhouses, and that animal sacrifices
violate the anti-cruelty statute of the State
of Florida, and the various zoning regula-
tions of the City of Hialeah.
Although the ordinances are not reli-
giously neutral but were intended to stop
the practice of animal sacrifice in the City
of Hialeah, the ordinances were not passed
to interfere with religious beliefs, but rath-
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er to regulate conduct. The ordinances
have three compelling secular purposes: 1)
to prevent cruelty to animals; 2) to safe-
guard the health, welfare and safety of the
community; and 3) to prevent the adverse
psychological effect on children exposed to
such sacrifices.
Plaintiffs have not been prosecuted by
Defendant for any violations or intended
violations of these ordinances. Additional-
ly, no groups have been registered or au-
thorized under 87-71 to investigate animal
cruelty complaints. Plaintiffs have not
sought to amend the City's laws regulating
slaughterhouses, but, on July 12, 1989, for
the first time sought zoning authorization
to operate their current property as a
slaughterhouse. At this time, there are no
licensed slaughterhouses in the City of Hia-
leah, and zoning would not permit a slaugh-
terhouse. Plaintiffs have not tried to chal-
lenge this zoning.
D. Discriminatory Treatment
The Church first took possession and be-
gan the cleanup of the property located at
173 W. 5th Street, in Hialeah, Florida, on
April 1, 1987. The premises required sig-
nificant work before the Church could
move in and actually occupy the build-
ings."
In early April, 1987, Fernando Pichardo,
the administrative director and corporate
secretary of the Church, contacted the wa-
ter and sewer department, Florida Power &
Light, and Southern Bell. Fernando Pi-
chardo put a $100 commercial deposit on
the water and sewage service and a $200
deposit on the FP & L service. Several
38. Before the Church took possession, the prem-
ises had been a used car lot and was in bad
repair. There was oil on the ground and car
parts lying around; windows were broken; the
grass was high; and the buildings needed repair
work before they could be occupied.
39. The Certificate of Incorporation needed to
have the Church's non-profit status marked on
it.
40. It later developed that documentation of
sales tax exemption was not necessary.
41. The area was zoned for churches.
problems then arose. First, the waste ser-
vice was not provided; although the service
was billed to the Church. Second, FP & L
shut off the existing power at the Church
and refused to reconnect the power until
the City gave it final approval and issued a
Certificate of Occupancy to the Church.
In registering the Church with the City
to obtain the necessary occupational li-
cense, Fernando Pichardo ran into several
delays. The City required that he provide
an original certificate of incorporation from
the State of Florida for the Church,39 and
proof of the Church's tax free status.40
The City also needed to check the zoning of
the property to make sure that it was
zoned for churches.41 In all, it took three
days to get the necessary information and
documents together and register the
Church. While Fernando Pichard might
have felt that this was unusual, the Court
does not find it unusual at all that it took
three days to process the application
through the City. There was certainly no
evidence that any delay resulted from any
discriminatory intent, and the testimony did
not reveal that the Church was treated any
differently than any other applicant.
The application for licensing and zoning
approval was originally filled out on May
27, 198 7 ,1Z and completed on May 29,
1987.11 On May 29, 1987, a Friday, the
documentation was turned over to the in-
spector's department so that the inspectors
could come out and do the inspections. On
the next Monday, June 1, 1987, several
inspectors turned up to do the various nec-
essary inspections. It is the usual practice
of that department to inspect premises on
42. The application was originally filled out and
filed by Ernesto Pichardo after an official of the
City came to the premises to tell him that the
Church was operating in violation of the licens-
ing requirements. That official drove Pichardo
to City Hall to begin the paperwork.
43. That application did not mention that the
Church wished to perform animal slaughter.
On July 10, 1989, just two weeks before this trial
began, the Church for the first time applied for
an occupational license to perform animal
slaughter for consumption on its premises.
That application has been held in abeyance
pending the outcome of this litigation.
723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
the next working day after receiving the
application.
There were three inspections that the
Church premises did not pass on June 1,
1987: the fire inspection, the electrical in-
spection and the plumbing inspection. The
failures were not the result of discriminato-
ry action on the part of the inspectors or
any City official. The Church passed the
fire inspection two days later.
The Church failed the electrical inspec-
tion because of faulty wiring in an air
conditioner and a faulty disconnect switch
on the outside of the building. The electri-
cal inspector also found an electrical meter
that was not designed for that use. The
inspector notified FP & L and requested
that the power be disconnected from that
unsafe meter. A permit was taken out by
a licensed electrical contractor on July 7,
1987, and the electrical problems were cor-
rected and completed on July 13, 1987.
The Church failed the plumbing inspec-
tion because the South Florida Code re-
quires that for this type of use, separate
bathrooms must be installed for men and
women. There was only one bathroom on
the premises and another bathroom had to
be added. A building permit for the addi-
tional bathroom was obtained on July 29,
1987 and a plumbing permit was filed for
on August 3, 1987. A plumbing inspection
was done on August 4, 1987, and the final
inspection was called for and issued on
August 6, 1987. A certificate of occupancy
was issued by the City on August 7, 1987,
one day after the final inspection.
Florida Power & Light is prohibited from
supplying service to a commercial property
that has not been approved for an occupa-
tional license nor received an approval on
the electrical inspection. The Church's
power was disconnected, after a five-day
notice to the Church, because it was discov-
ered that it had been turned on without
authorization and with the use of the im-
proper meter." As soon as the proper
license and approvals were received, the
power was turned on. FP & L did not
treat this account differently than any oth-
44. This led FP & L to conclude that the power
er commercial account, except that in dis-
connecting the service, James Kirk first
called FP & L's legal department. He tes-
tified that he did this because of the fact
that it was a church involved.
The solid waste department failed to pick
up the garbage, even though the Church
had placed its deposit and was being billed.
The water department collects the deposit
and does the billing and the waste depart-
ment has no control over those functions.
On the day that the waste department was
notified that the Church was not receiving
its services, a supervisor went to the prem-
ises and obtained a letter of intent to start
service on that same day. The waste de-
partment then corrected the problem, start-
ed service on that same day, and credited
the Church's account with the amount that
the Church had been billed.
There was testimony to the effect that
the council meetings that took place con-
cerning the Church were done in a mob
atmosphere and that the council members
intended to discriminate against the Church
and to stop :he Church. There was abso-
lutely no evtdence that any council mem-
ber, at any -ime, attempted to influence the
various licensing, zoning and building de-
partments of the City, or the waste depart-
ment, FP & L or Southern Bell. The vari-
ous delays and problems that the Church
encountered with its physical plant were
either the result of the premises' failure to
meet the necessary building requirements,
or because of bureaucratic paperwork, and
not because of any discriminatory intent on
the part of any individual, agency or com-
pany.
Plaintiffs complained of two instances of
alleged increased law enforcement scruti-
ny. First, a "police perimeter" was estab-
lished around the Church premises when
the first outdoor mass was held. Second, a
police vehic!e stopped Fernando Pichardo
one night as he was leaving the premises
with some trash and asked him what he
was doing. When he replied that just leav-
ing the premises, no further conversation
was had. This Court does not hold that
either of these instances were the result of
had been tt-ned on by other than FP & L
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a discriminatory intent by the City, but,
instead, were just instances of the police
carrying out their duties. The "police pe-
rimeter" was, in fact, a protection for the
Church due to the intense and often hostile
media coverage.
The Church also alleges that the ordi-
nances were passed because of the council
members' intent to discriminate against the
Church and to keep the Church from estab-
lishing a physical presence in the City.
There was no evidence to support this con-
tention. All the evidence established was
that the council members' intent was to
stop the practice of animal sacrifice in the
City. Although this concern was prompted
by the Church's public announcement that
it intended to come out into the open and
practice its religious rituals, including ani-
mal sacrifice, the council's intent was to
stop animal sacrifice whatever individual,
religion or cult it was practiced by.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standing
Plaintiffs seek to have the ordinances
promulgated by the City of Hialeah de-
clared unconstitutional, both in their totali-
ty and as applied to Plaintiffs. The Declar-
atory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, re-
quires that before a court can issue declar-
atory relief, an "actual controvery" must
exist. Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547
(11th Cir.1985). "[T]he continuing contr-
overy may not be conjectural, hypothetical,
or contingent; it must be real and immedi-
ate, and create a definite, rather than spec-
ulative threat of future injury." rd. at
1551-522. Further, "federal courts should
not consider the abstract constitutionality
of municipal policies." Kerr v. City of
West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1554
(11th Cir.1989).
Standing to sue requires that a plaintiff
has suffered a distinct and palpable injury
that is likely to be redressed if the request-
ed relief is granted. Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450
(1976). Redressability is an essential com-
ponent of the standing requirement and
Plaintiffs must fail the test if removal of
one purported barrier to their conduct
would not secure any meaningful relief be-
cause other barriers remained. Greater
Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Gold-
schmidt, 627 F.2d 258, 261-65 (D.C.Cir.
1980); Church of Scientology Flag Service
Organization, Inc. v. City of Clearwater,
777 F.2d 598, 606 (11th Cir.1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90
L.Ed.2d 656 (1986).
If this Court were to find that the ordi-
nances were invalid, Plaintiffs would still
be prohibited from performing ritual sacri-
fices under § 828.12 of the Florida Stat-
utes. See Opinion Attorney General 87-56
(1987). Additionally, there are several pro-
visions of the Hialeah City Code that would
apply, including zoning provisions, health
and sanitation provisions and licensing pro-
visions.
This Court also remains troubled by the
ripeness issue. In the instant case, Plain-
tiffs have not attempted to show repeated
prosecutions, or pointed to any enforce-
ment under the ordinances. Additionally,
at no point have Plaintiffs raised any free
exercise challenge addressed toward the
validity of slaughterhouse zoning regula-
tions that Plaintiffs might encounter. In-
stead, Plaintiffs assert that the city council
passed the ordinances in an attempt to
target the Church in particular and the
practitioners of Santeria generally. Specif-
ically, Plaintiffs allege that the passage of
the ordinances was intended to force the
Church out of Hialeah, and to chill the
religious freedom of Santeria practitioners
by imposing criminal sanctions on practices
that are an integral part of that religion.
This Court therefore restricts itself to the
consideration of those issues, and will not
resolve the abstract questions of whether
all laws restricting animal sacrifice for reli-
gious purposes are unconstitutional, or
whether Plaintiffs could practice animal
sacrifice if they were in an area zoned for
slaughterhouses.
B. State Statutory Preemption
The first argument presented by Plain-
tiffs is that the City's ordinances are inval-
id because the ordinances are in conflict
0
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with Chapter 828, Florida Statutes. Specif-
ically, Plaintiffs argue that the ordinances
conflict with Florida law because: 1)
§ 828.22(3) protects the ritual slaughter of
animals; and 2) the ordinances provide for
a criminal penalty and authorize private
parties to assist in the prosecution of viola-
tions of the ordinance and thus violate the
restrictions on ordinances set forth in F.S.
§ 828.27.
An ordinance need not be identical with a
Florida statute in order to be valid. Validi-
ty is presumed and the party challenging a
municipal ordinance bears the burden of
proving that ordinance is invalid. Wallace
v. Town of Palm Beach, 624 F.Supp. 864,
869 (S.D.Fla.1985); Bennett M. Lifter, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 482 So.2d
479, 481 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986); City of
Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla.
1957). An ordinance is preempted by state
law only where the municipal ordinance
directly conflicts with the state statute.
Boven v. City of St. Petersburg, 73 So.2d
232, 234 (Fla.1954). Thus, the ordinances
in the case sub judice are only invalid if
they conflict with F.S. § 828.27(4).
Florida Statute § 828.27(4) permits a mu-
nicipality to adopt an ordinance identical to
Chapter 828, but forbids a "municipal ordi-
nance relating to animal control or cruelty
[from] conflict[ing] with the provisions of"
Chapter 828. A municipality need not
adopt the exact wording of Chapter 828.
Additionally, a municipality may go beyond
the state statute so long as it does not
conflict with the statute. Lamar-Orlando
Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormand
Beach, 415 So.2d 1312, 1321 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1982); City of Miami Beach v. Rocio
Corp., 404 So.2d 1066, 1070 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1981). Municipalities often exercise
this privilege by providing for greater en-
forcement measures or stricter controls.
Plaintiffs first claim is that the ordi-
nances conflict generally with the state
slaughter laws, F.S. §§ 828.22-828.26, and,
specifically, with the ritual slaughter ex-
emption contained in F.S. § 828.22(3). Sec-
45. "(Olpinions of the attorney general are per-
suasive and entitled to great weight in constru-
ing Florida Statutes." State v. Office of Comp-
SUPPLEMENT
tions 828.22-828.26, Florida Statutes, relate
to the use of humane methods in the
slaughter of livestock for food. See Opin-
ion Attorney General 87-56 (1987). The
statute was enacted to conform Florida law
to the provisions of the Federal Humane
Slaughter Act of 1958, and is nearly identi-
cal to that Act. 7 U.S.C. H§ 1901-1906.
[1] The exemption for "ritual slaugh-
ter" contained in § 828.22(3) applies only to
religious slaughtering of animals for food.
Opinion Attorney General 87-56 (1987).t
For example, an exception has been recog-
nized to apply to the production of Kosher
meat where animals are slaughtered ac-
cording to the Jewish ritual slaughtering
method known as shehitah. Jones v. But:,
374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.1974). The Hia-
leah ordinances, on the other hand, only
prohibit sacrificing animals where the pri-
mary purpose is not food consumption.
Accordingly, there is no conflict between
the ordinances and § 828.22(3).
Animal sacrifice also violates Florida
Statutes § 828.12, which makes it a crimi-
nal violation for one to "unnecessarily" or
"cruelly" kill an animal. See Wilkerson v.
State, 401 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Fla.1981). The
Attorney General's opinion notes that the
ritual killing of an .animal does not consti-
tute a "necessary" killing so as to make
the prohibition in § 828.12 against unneces-
sarily or cruelly killing an animal inapplica-
ble. Hialeah ordinance 87-52 defines "sac-
rifice" as to "unnecessarily kill, torment,
torture or mutilate an animal in a public or
private ritual or ceremony not for the pri-
mary purpose of food consumption.
Thus, the Hialeah ordinance and the Flor-
ida Statutes are consistent in their treat-
ment of animal sacrifice.
Plaintiffs next argue that, by exempting
ritual slaughter from the provisions of the
Act, the legislature intended to preempt
municipalities from legislating any regula-
tions whatsoever on ritual slaughter, and
thus, Ordinances 87-52 and 87-72 imper-
missibly regulate slaughter.
troller, 416 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App-
1982).
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[2] Neither ordinance conflicts with the
exemption afforded to ritual slaughter.
Ordinance 87-52 states that "[n]o person
shall ... slaughter ... any ... animal,
intending to use such animal for food pur-
poses." Ordinance 87-52 also states that
"nothing in this ordinance is to be inter-
preted as prohibiting any licensed estab-
lishment for slaughtering for food pur-
poses where such activity is properly zoned
and/or permitted under state and local law
and under rules promulgated by the Flor-
ida Department of Agriculture." There-
fore, ordinance 87-52 only bans slaughter
if done outside the regulatory requirements
of both local and state laws.
The State of Florida left the siting and
inspection of slaughterhouses to localities.
See Fla.Stat. § 585.34(3) ("Municipal corpo-
rations may establish and maintain the in-
spections of slaughterhouses"). Land-use
control is a local prerogative that is exer-
cised through the use of zoning ordinances.
See Fla.Stat. §§ 163.3161-163.3213; Hills-
borough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc.,
v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So.2d 610,
612-13 (Fla.1976). Zoning laws and regula-
tions that are enacted by municipalities in
the exercise of the municipalities' police
power are proper. Scurlock v. City of
Lynn Haven, Fla., 858 F.2d 1521, 1525
(11th Cir.1988) ("Municipalities may zone
land to pursue any number of legitimate
objectives related to the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the communi-
ty."). Accordingly, the City of Hialeah act-
ed properly in enacting zoning regulations
that clarified that ritual sacrifice was not a
protected practice under the ritual slaugh-
ter exception to the Humane Slaughter
Act, and that all slaughters could only be
performed in areas zoned for that use. 8
Plaintiffs next challenge the validity of
the ordinances on the ground that the Hia-
leah ordinances provide for a criminal pen-
alty, while § 828.27(2) only permits a civil
penalty. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the
46. The City of Hialeah presently has no areas
that are zoned for slaughterhouses. As men-
tioned before in footnote 41, the Church on July
10, 1989, just before the trial of this matter,
applied for an occupations license to perform
animal slaughter for consumption on Church
ordinances are in conflict with the state
statute and must be struck down.
[31 Section 828.27(2) controls penalties
in "ordinances relating to animal control or
cruelty." Ordinance 87-72 is an ordinance
"Prohibiting The Slaughtering Of Animals
Upon Any Premises in the City of Hialeah,
Florida, Except Those Premises Properly
Zoned As A Slaughter House." Ordinance
87-72 provides, in part, that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, persons, corpora-
tions or associations to slaughter any ani-
mal on any premises in the City of Hialeah,
Florida, except those properly zoned as a
slaughter house, and meeting all the
health, safety and sanitation codes pre-
scribed by the City for the operation of a
slaughter house.
Ordinance 87-52, and the ordinance
amended by it, Ordinance 87-40, also relate
to zoning, and provide that:
Nothing in this ordinance is to be inter-
preted as prohibiting any licensed estab-
lishment from slaughtering for food pur-
poses any animals which are specifically
raised for food purposes where such ac-
tivity is properly zoned and/or permitted
under state and local law and under rules
promulgated by the Florida Department
of Agriculture.
Therefore, all three of these ordinances are
zoning regulations that explicitly prohibit
certain acts except where properly zoned.
The penalty requirements of the ordi-
nances, therefore, do not conflict with any
penalty requirement if Chapter 828, which
is limited only to "ordinance related to ani-
mal control or cruelty." While one of the
secular purposes of ordinances 87-40, 87-
52, and 87-72 is to prevent cruelty to ani-
mals, those ordinances are first and fore-
most zoning ordinances, and are not in and
of themselves, "ordinances related to ani-
mal control or cruelty."
The City of Hialeah clearly has the au-
thority to prescribe penalties for zoning
premises. Therefore, the issue of whether the
Church could receive a zoning variance to per-
form animal sacrifice, where the animal is to be
consumed, has never been directly addressed,
and is not before the Court at this time.
723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
violations different from those relating to
animal control or cruelty. Because the or-
dinances do not solely relate to animal con-
trol or cruelty, the statute establishing the
maximum penalty for violation of such an
ordinance is inapplicable.
Additionally, even if § 828.27 did apply
to the ordinances, that provision specifical-
ly authorizes municipalities to enact an or-
dinance identical to the state law "except
as to penalty." While § 828.27 focuses on
ordinances with a civil penalty, another sec-
tion of that Chapter, § 828.12, directly pro-
vides a criminal punishment, as a first de-
gree misdemeanor, for unnecessarily or
cruelly beating, mutilating or killing an ani-
mal.47 The City's criminal penalties are
therefore fully consistent with the state
statutes prescribed penalty for the same
misconduct.
Plaintiffs last challenge to the validity of
the ordinances concerns the provisions in
ordinances 87-71 and 87-72 which provide
that agents of private organizations may
"assist(] in the prosecution of any viola-
tion(s]." Plaintiffs argue that this provi-
sion conflicts with the state law.
(4] Ordinances 87-71 and 87-72 do not
provide for prosecution by agents, only
that such agents may assist in the prosecu-
tion. 8  This suggests that such agents
could assist in testifying, providing evi-
dence, and generally aiding the municipali-
ty in pursuing a prosecution. Further, the
state statute itself has a provision that
provides for appointed agents to investi-
gate violators. See § 828.03. This provi-
sion was amended to "provide for investi-
gation rather than prosecution of offenders
by agents of described societies." Fla.Sta.
Ann., Chapter 828, at 431. The Hialeah
ordinances certainly do not provide for the
agents to prosecute violators, but only to
assist in the prosecution. This is certainly
within the purview of Chapter 828 and is
therefore not in conflict with that statute.
The ordinances at issuance here clearly
do not conflict with Florida state law and,
47. Section 828.12 was recently amended to in-
clude a provision making intentional torture of
animals punishable as a felony. See Ch. 89-194.
therefore, are not preempted. According-
ly, this Court must now address directly
the constitutional issue raised by Plaintiffs.
C. First Amendment Challenge
This Court feels that there is a need to
put this case in the proper perspective.
Plaintiffs essentially represent immigrants
who have brought to these shores not only
the traditions and customs normally attrib-
utable to a migrating people, but also the
religion of Santeria, a religion which has
only recently begun to be practiced in this
country. Without question, it extends back
to Africa, where it was an openly accept-
able form of religion some 400 years ago.
After having travelled for four centuries
and thousands of miles, it came to Miami
and has an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 reli-
gious followers in this community.
Migration has been the lifeblood of this
country. As each of the tens of thousands
came, they brought with them their unique
heritages which were ultimately integrated
and woven into the fabric which is Amer-
ica. The strength of that fabric has grown
over two centuries.
Those who fled poverty found opportuni-
ty; those who were deprived of the oppor-
tunity of expression found freedom of
speech; and those who were deprived of
the opportunity to worship God found free-
dom of religion. These newfound free-
doms, however, were not unabridged and
absolute. The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads today as it
did when it was ratified on December 15,
1791:
Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
With the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment on July 9, 1868, it specifically
made the First Amendment applicable to
48. To date, the City of Hialeah has never ap-
pointed any agents under this provision.
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state action when it provided that. "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." If one
were to adopt as a constitutional philsophy
the writings of John Stuart Mill or John
Locke, the privileges afforded under the
First Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the freedoms of speech and
religion, would be incapable of restriction
in any form. As it pertains to particularly
freedom of speech, certainly Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Douglas would have
seen fit to do so. See e.g., Black, the Bill
of Rights, 35 NYU L.Rev. 865 (1960); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508, 77
S.CL 1304, 1321, L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Neither Justices
Black nor Douglas, however, expressed the
constitutional philosophy of the courts in
giving meaning to the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
No one for a moment would espouse the
view that freedom of speech would allow
an individual to shout "Fire" in a crowded
theater. Although all ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance
have the full protection of the Constitution,
implicit in the history of the First Amend-
ment is the rejection of obscenity as being
utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance. Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476,
484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308-09, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498
(1957).
Freedom of religion, like freedom of
speech, is subject to a similar analysis
when we are dealing, as here, with the
manner in which the religion is conducted
rather than the beliefs of those seeking to
exercise it. It is the former and not the
latter which is the subject matter of this
Court's opinion.
(5] Plaintiffs claim that the City's ordi-
nances unconstitutionally impinge upon
their free exercise of religion. The Elev-
enth Circuit has set forth a framework to
be used when a court is addressing this
issue. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721
F.2d 729 (11th Cir.1983), cert denied, 469
49. The district court in United States v. Billie,
667 F.Supp. 1485, 1494-97 (S.D.Fla.1987), relied
on the analytical steps set forth in Grosz to
U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52
(1984).1 Before the Court balances com-
peting governmental and religious inter-
ests, the government's action faces two
threshold tests: the law must regulate con-
duct rather than belief, and it must have
both a secular purpose and effect. Id. at
733. The government in the case at hand
has met both tests.
First, the ordinances clearly are directed
at conduct and not belief. The conduct
sought to be prescribed is the performance
of animal sacrifice. The ordinances do not
attempt to regulate belief and thus the law
clearly meets the first threshold test.
The second threshold test is whether the
ordinances have a secular purpose and ef-
fect. Id. at 733. Defendant acknowledges
that the challenged ordinances arose in re-
sponse to the opening of Plaintiff Church
in the City; however, that does not neces-
sarily indicate that the purpose of the ordi-
nances was to exclude the Church from the
City. Instead, the evidence showed that
the Defendant responded to Plaintiffs' an-
nounced intention that Plaintiffs planned to
conduct animal sacrifices.
Defendant was aware that animal sacri-
fices were being conducted in private
homes. That practice was becoming an
increasing problem and the Church's an-
nouncement triggered this legislative ac-
tion, which was not aimed solely at Plain-
tiffs, but was an attempt to address the
issue of animal sacrifice as a whole.
The ordinances do not on their face vio-
late the secular purpose test. Ordinance
87-40 adopts the State's animal cruelty
laws and does not mention religious con-
duct at all. Ordinance 87-72 prohibits any-
one from slaughtering animals anywhere in
the City except in properly zoned slaugh-
terhouses. Ordinance 87-52, adopted from
the model statute provided by the Humane
Society of the United States to the City
Attorney's office, provides that "[n]o per-
son shall ... possess, sacrifice, or slaugh-
ter any ... animal for food purposes."
This section applies to "any group or indi-
evaluate a Seminole Indian's free exercise chal-
lenge to a conviction for taking a Florida pan-
ther in violation of the Endangered Species Act.
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vidual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices
animals for any type of ritual." Ordinance
87-52 therefore acts as a blanket and fa-
cially neutral prohibition on the killing of
animals by anyone for any reason, except
in slaughterhouses. This ordinance was
not meant to single out persons engaged in
ritual sacrifice, but to put those persons on
notice that the state exemption for ritual
slaughter only applied to commercial ritual
slaughter, done in slaughterhouses.
[6] Ordinance 87-71 amends 87-52 to
inclide prosecutorial assistance by reg-
istered agents and reiterates the absolute
prohibition of sacrifice.50 The use of the
phrase "ritual or ceremony," in ordinances
87-52 and 87-71, does not impermissibly
target religious conduct. A federal court,
in discussing the meaning of the ritual
slaughter exception in the Federal Humane
Slaughter Act, recognized that "ritual" is
not synonymous with "religious." Jones v.
Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 419 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 22, 42 L.Ed.2d
36 (1974).s1
"Ritual" or "ceremony," therefore,
reaches not just demonstrably bona fide
religious conduct, but also includes the kill-
ing of animals by groups that would proba-
bly not enjoy First Amendment protection,
such as satanic cults. Further, even if the
use of the words "ritual" and "ceremony"
are understood as targeting primarily reli-
gious conduct, nothing in the First Amend-
ment prevents a municipality from specifi-
cally regulating such conduct when it is
50. Sacrifice is defined as the unnecessary killing
of an animal "in a public or private ritual or
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption."
51. Lower courts are bound by the summary
decisions of the Supreme Court, unless reversed
by that Court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
334-45, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2284-85, 45 L.Ed.2d 223
(1975).
52. Whether the conduct is in fact incompatible
with public health and welfare is left to the
balancing phase of the free exercise inquiry.
53. Plaintiffs cannot maintain a facial challenge
to the ordinances. A statute is overbroad on its
face only if it is unconstitutional "in every con-
ceivable application" or seeks to prohibit a
broad range of protected conduct. Members of
deemed inconsistent with public health and
welfare.52
Strict religious neutrality is not required
by the First Amendment. See Wallace r.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83, 105 S.Ct. 2479.
2503, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 639, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1334-35, 55 L.Ed.2d
593 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting
that "government (may] take religion into
account when necessary to further secular
purposes"). Courts have repeatedly upheld
laws explicitly mentioning religious con-
duct so long as they serve a secular pur-
pose. See e.g., Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp.
at 1292-93 (noting that explicit religious
exemptions in laws are permissible, citing
Sunday closing and conscientious objector
decisions). Thus, in this case, the ordi-
nances have at most an effect on Plaintiffs'
religious conduct that is incidental to the
ordinances' secular purpose and effect.
(7] After the two threshold tests are
passed, the court is faced with the difficult
task of balancing governmental and reli-
gious interests. This "balance depends
upon the cost to the government of altering
its activity to allow the religious practice to
continue unimpeded versus the cost to the
religious interest imposed by the govern-
ment activity." Grosz, 721 F.2d at 734.
However, before engaging in that bal-
ancing process, the Plaintiffs must identify
the costs on their religious activities im-
posed by the government, and these costs
must be the consequence of legally cogni-
zable infringements on religious freedom.
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 796, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 LEd.2d
772 (1984); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 767-74, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3359-64. 73
L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich.
759 F.2d 1511. 1513 (11th Cir.1985). Plaintiffs
do not argue that the ordinances would be un-
constitutionally applied to the killing of animals
for nonreligious purposes, or to inhumane kill-
ing. "The possibility that [an ordinance] might
be unconstitutionally applied to certain reli-
gious practices does not render it void on its
face where the remainder of the [ordinance]
covers a whole range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable conduct." Billie'
667 F.Supp. at 1495. Because these ordinance
can constitutionally apply to a wide range of
conduct other than Plaintiffs', the ordinances
are not void on their face.
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Plaintiffs have shown that the practice of marijuana use and persuaded the courts to
animal sacrifice is a integral part of their uphold those laws are precisely the govern-
religion. Further, the evidence has estab- ment interests at issue here. The evidence
lished that not all of the animals sacrificed at trial revealed a risk of physical harm to
are consumed." The fact that Plaintiffs members of both Plaintiff Church and the
have never directly attacked the zoning public from disease and infestation. It is
requirements for slaughterhouses does not beyond dispute that the government has a
dispose of the larger issue of the killing of compelling interest in controlling disease.
animals not for food purposes.u Thus, this See e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
Court has no doubt that the ordinances do 158, 166-67, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645
burden Plaintiffs' religious practices. (1944); Johansson v. Board of Animal
The ordinances at issue were passed by Health, 601 F.Supp. 1018, 1027 (D.Minn.
the City because of the perceived need to 1985); Conner -. Carlton, 223 So.2d 324
prevent cruelty to animals, to safeguard (Fla.1969), appeal dismissedfor want of a
the health, welfare and safety of the com- substantial fed. ques., 396 U.S. 272, 90
munity, and to prevent possible adverse
psychological effects on children exposed As discussed in detail in this Court's
to such sacrifices. findings of fact, animal carcasses are often
left in public places, leading to an increased
1) Health Hazard risk of disease. Additionally, the animals
are often obtained from sources that haveCourts have routinely upheld bans on not maintained the animals in sanitary con-
religious conduct when such conduct posed
a clear danger to the health of the public. any inspection process. This is especially
For example, courts have, without excep- dangerous when dealingwith chickens, due
tion, upheld ordinances and injunctions pro- to the increased risk of salmonella. Priests
hibiting ritual snake handling even when have no training in recognizing diseased
such snake handling was central to the animals, but rely solely on observation of
religious practice. See e.g., State ex rel the animals, an unreliable way of detecting
Swann v. Pack, 527. S.W.2d 99, 109 & n. 15 disease. The City, therefore, has more
(Tenn.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954, 96 than met its burden of proving that there is
S.Ct. 1429, 47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1976). Similar a substantial health risk generated by the
reasoning has been used by courts in up- killing of these animals in areas not regu-
holding ordinances banning the use of mar- lated as slaughterhouses.
ijuana despite its centrality to certain reli-
gious practice. See e.g., United States v. 2) Welfare of Children
Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824-26 (11th Cir. The governmental interest in guarantee-
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S.Ct. ing the welfare of children is particularly
1497, 75 L.Ed.2d 929 (1983).56  strong. See e.g., ew York v. Ferber, 458
The compelling interests in public health U.S. 747, 756-58, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354-55,
and welfare that motivated the passage of 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); United States v.
legislation banning snake handling and Nemuras, 567 F.Supp. 87, 89 (D.Md.1983),
54. For example, the animals sacrificed in heal-
ing rites and in death rites are never consumed.
55. Plaintiffs also contend that because the Plain-
tiff Church is not a "commercial" enterprise, the
Church could not qualify under a slaughter-
house zoning variance even if such a variance
could be obtained.
56. In Middleton, this Circuit held that any free
exercise interest in marijuana use was out-
weighed by the compelling state interest in regu-
lating drug use. Middleton, 690 F.2d at 825-26.
The Court rejected various state court decisions
permitting the religious use of peyote by the
Native American Church as not binding and
inconsistent with circuit precedent to the con-
trary. Id. at 826. See also Peyote Way Church
of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F.Supp. 1342, 1346-49
(N.D.Tex.1988) (limited federal statutory exemp-
tion permitting Native Americans to use peyote
was nothing more than a grandfather clause
and the court would not expand it into a reli-
gious exception regardless of the sincerity of
plaintiffs beliefs).
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affd, 740 F.2d 286 (4th Cir.1984); Grtiffin
v. State, 396 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla.1981). The
Supreme Court has held that the risk of
emotional injury to children outweighs
countervailing religious and parental
rights. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital,
278 F.Supp. 488, 504 (W.D.N.D.Wash.1967),
affd, 390 U.S. 598, 88 S.Ct. 1260, 20
L.Ed.2d 158 (1968).
The evidence at trial established that ex-
posure to the ritual sacrifice of animals
imperils the psychological well-being of
children and increases the likelihood that a
child will become more aggressive and vio-
lent. Based on the expert testimony, the
City has shown that the risk to children
justifies the absolute ban on animal sacri-
fice.
3) Cruelty to Animals
Equally compelling is the City's interest
in the protection of animals from cruelty
and unnecessary killing. "It has long been
the public policy of this country to avoid
unnecessary cruelty to animals." Human
Society of Rochester v. Lyng, 633 F.Supp.
480, 486 (W.D.N.Y.1986). The Florida Su-
preme Court observed more than two dec-
ades ago that "it is now generally recog-
nized that legislation which has for its pur-
pose the protection of animals from harass-
ment and ill-treatment is a valid exercise of
the police power." C.E. America, Inc. v.
Antinori, 210 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla.1968).
Plaintiffs presented testimony that the
killing of the animals is not inhumane.
This Court does not agree. Expert testi-
mony established that the method of killing
is unreliable and not humane, and that the
animals, before being sacrificed, are often
kept in conditions that produce a great deal
of fear and stress in the animal. Often the
57. The alternatives do not address the issues of
child welfare or the unreliable method of kill-
ing, among others.
58. For example, Pichardo testified that the
Church would follow any reasonable restric-
tions on how the animals are obtained and
maintained, as well as how the carcasses are
animals are kept in filthy, overcrowded
conditions, and sometimes are not given
adequate food or water. Additionally, the
animals perceive both pain and fear during
the actual sacrificial ceremony.
The policies and purposes underlying the
ordinances therefore reflect three separate
and compelling governmental interests;
public health and the control of disease, the
risk to children, and animal welfare. More-
over, the City has a compelling interest in
prohibiting the slaughter or sacrifice of
animals within areas of the City not zoned
for slaughterhouse use. The interest of
the city in prohibiting slaughter of animals
in private homes and residential area is
particularly strong. The assertion that the
slaughter is for religious purposes does not
diminish this interest because the City may
regulate the place and manner of religious
expression as long as there is no content
classification and so long as the regulation
is reasonable. See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 740.
An ordinance will withstand constitution-
al challenge if an exception for religious
purpose will "unduly interfere with fulfill-
ment of the governmental interest." Unit-
ed States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259, 102
S.Ct. 1051, 1056, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982).
Whether an exception for religious pur-
poses would "unduly interfere" with
government policy is a looser standard
than whether an ordinance is "closely tai-
lored" or the "least restrictive means"
standards urged by Plaintiffs. Moreover,
Plaintiffs have not shown that their pro-
posed alternatives would satisfy the public
health and animal welfare concerns.5.
Plaintiffs simply speculate, without any
factual support, that if they are allowed to
practice openly, they would be able not
only to control all aspects of the animal
sacrifices in a way which would satisfy
these concerns,38 but that, through their
example, all other practitioners of Santeria
disposed of. While this Court believes that
Plaintiff is sincere, this is simply not a workable
solution because Pichardo himself admits that
he doesn't even have an estimate of how many
people practice Santeria in the City; nor does he
know how those people obtain the animals or
dispose of the carcasses. He can only speculate.
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would conform their behavior to follow the
same guidelines. 9
Most importantly, the carving out of an
exception for any group would defeat the
City's valid and compelling interests.
Courts have consistently refused religious
exemptions when they would create admin-
istrative or enforcement problems. See
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-
09, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1796-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 965
(1963); Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739. The testi-
mony revealed the extent of the problems
caused by animal sacrifice. A large part of
the problem is because of the number of
practitioners, who are not limited to those
who practice Santeria. It is often difficult,
if not impossible, to tell who is responsible
for a particular sacrifice. A religious ex-
ception for Santeria practitioners is simply
unworkable because it is unenforceable.
Any contemplated exception would have to
cover all religions. See United States v.
Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1469-70 n. 32 (9th
Cir.1989). The exception would, in effect,
swallow the rule.
A balance of the compelling government
interest served by the ordinances against
the burden of Plaintiffs of not being al-
lowed to ritually sacrifice animals, with all
of the attendant risks to public health and
animal welfare, must be resolved in favor
of the City. Even absolute proscriptions of
religious conduct are constitutional when
the law serves a compelling state interest.
See e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879) (cited with
approval last Term in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, -, 108 S.Ct.
1444, 1451, 99 L.Ed.2d 753, 764 (1988)).
Compelling governmental interests, includ-
ing public health and safety and animal
welfare, fully justify the absolute prohibi-
tion on ritual sacrifice at issue here, and
any effort to exempt purportedly religious
conduct from the strictures of the City's
laws would significantly hinder the attain-
59. Pichardo could give this Court no assurance
that those who follow, in his eyes, a deviant
form of Santeria, would conform to any regula-
tions at all. Additionally, the religion has al-
ways been a secret religion and much is still not
known. It is inconceivable that the religious
practitioners would accept the type of regula-
ment of those compelling interests. There-
fore, this Court holds that the challenged
ordinances do pass constitutional muster.
D. 198d Claim
This Court granted Summary Judgment
as to the Mayor and City Councilmen and
held that the ordinances and resolutions
that they passed did not amount to an
official policy of harassment. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 688 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.Fla.1988).
At most, this Court found that Plaintiffs
had alleged "nothing more than that De-
fendants, by their policies, created an atmo-
sphere conducive to acts such as these tak-
ing place." Id. at 1529.
[81 Where an injury is inflicted solely
by its employees or agents, a local govern-
ment is not liable. See Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445,
453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (respondeat su-
perior liability unavailable under § 1983).
It is only when execution of a municipali-
ty's official policy or custom inflicts injury
that the government as an entity can be
held liable under § 1983. Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Boilerplate allegations
of municipal "policy," without any factual
allegations to support them, do not estab-
lish a § 1983 claim against a municipality.
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103
L.Ed.2d 412, 427 (1989). A single instance
of unconstitutional conduct is insufficient
to impose civil rights liability on a city
unless there is proof that the activity was
covered by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy that can be attributed to a
municipal policynaker. Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct.
2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). The
existence of an unconstitutional policy and
its origin must be separately proved and
tory controls on their activities that such con-
formity would require, especially in light of the
fact that their sacrifice, by the terms of their
religion, must be kept secret and cannot be
monitored. A less restrictive ordinance simply
could not be enforced.
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where the policy relied on is not itself un-
constitutional, the plaintiff is required to
present more proof than a single incident
to establish both the municipality's fault
and the causal connection between the poli-
cy and the constitutional deprivation. Id.
Cases involving analogous constitutional
challenges to municipal land-use restric-
tions place the burden of proving discrimi-
natory purpose or intent on plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S.
697, 707 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3178 n. 4, 92
L.Ed.2d 568 (1986); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270, n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555, 566, n. 21, 50
L.Ed:2d 450 (1977). Nor does evidence of a
negative public outcry directed against the
Church prove discriminatory zoning. See
Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica
Community Center, Inc., 309 So.2d 212,
215 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975).
[9] Plaintiffs have completely failed to
prove any acts of discrimination or harass-
ment in violation of Plaintiffs' right to free-
ly exercise their religion. As discussed at
length in this Court's findings of fact, the
Plaintiffs' allegations of discrimination by
the City are not supported by the facts.
CONCLUSION
The ordinances passed by the City of
Hialeah regulating the ritual sacrifice of
animals areconsistent with both state stat-
utes and the United States Constitution.
The ordinances target the indiscriminate
slaughter of animals in areas of the City
not zoned for such activities because of the
many attendant risks to both public health
and animal welfare. The ordinances are
not targeted at the Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye and practitioners of Santeria,
but are meant to prohibit all animal sacri-
fice, whether it be practiced by an individu-
al, a religion, or a cult. Additionally, there
was no proof of any discriminatory action
by the City against the Plaintiff Church or
any of its practitioners.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
Court finds in favor of Defendant and
against Plaintiffs, and FINAL JUDG-
MENT is hereby entered in favor of Defen-
dant, CITY OF HIALEAH, and against
Plaintiffs, who shall go hence without day.
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The National Transportation Safety
Board filed a petition to enforce subpoenas
in an investigation of a marine accident.
Vessel owners filed a motion to dismiss
petition and quash subpoenas. The Dis-
trict Court, Ryskamp, J., held that National
Transportation Safety Board did not have
jurisdiction under Independent Safety
Board Act to investigate an accident in
international waters between two foreign-
flag vessels under provisions specifically
limiting NTSB's authority to conduct extra-
territorial investigations to those accidents
involving a vessel of United States.
Motion to dismiss petition and quash
subpoenas granted.
1. International Law e7
Shipping e158
Under doctrine allowing exercise of
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
which causes "substantial" effect within
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